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ABSTRACT: Human dreams of a long and healthy life are becoming increasingly real. 
The advancement of medical technology allows to modify the genome or personalised 
therapy in order to avoid troublesome side effects. This process also leads to the blur-
ring of boundaries between humans and animals. Rats with induced human diseases 
are used for testing drugs for incurable illness; humanised pigs can donate organs that 
are compatible with the genome and immune system of the recipient. A brave new 
human is approaching, and new “human” animals are making this possible. The main 
objective of the article is to show the differences between the refinement of people 
and other animals and to analyse this phenomenon from an ethical point of view.
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INTRODUCTION
The accelerated development of technology and biomedical sciences is inevitably 
making an impact on humans. Both the length and quality of human life have changed 
over the last century (Lancaster  1990; Stomma 2008). At the same time, humans are 
increasingly marking their domain over Earth, creating new forms of life. Dubbed 
“liminal lives” by Susan Squier (2004), these have come to existence following bio-
technological experiments in controlled laboratory conditions (Bakke 2014). 
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The concept of the Anthropocene, which describes this situation, is becoming more 
and more apparent in scientific reflection. The situation provokes questions about 
people’s place in the world and their relationship with other animals and the environ-
ment. Is the human right to use the planet and others unlimited? How far can we go 
in using other animals to extend human life, or even to enhance people, referred to as 
“accelerating evolution” by transhumanists? 
Bringing the Earth under human control is not a new phenomenon. Already during 
the transition from a hunting and gathering to a pastoral and collecting society, peo-
ple changed their way of thinking and shaped plants and animals to meet their needs 
(Banaszak and Kmita 1994). However, never before were these changes so rapid and 
precise.
ANTHROPOCENE
The “Anthropocene” is a term that defines the present geological era characterised by 
the dominance human of activity and its effect on Earth (Waters 2016; Ellis 2018). The 
term was first used in the contemporary context by Paul Crutzen in 2000 (Zalasiewicz 
et al. 2010; Grinevald et al. 2011), suggesting that the modern era began in the second 
half of the 18th century: 
To assign a more specific date to the onset of the “Anthropocene” seems some-
what arbitrary, but we propose the latter part of the 18th century, although we 
are aware that alternative proposals can be made (some may even want to in-
clude the entire Holocene). However, we choose this date because, during the 
past two centuries, the global effects of human activities have become clearly 
noticeable. This is the period when data retrieved from glacial ice cores show the 
beginning of a growth in the atmospheric concentrations of several “greenhouse 
gases”, in particular, CO2 and CH4. Such a starting date also coincides with James 
Watt‘s invention of the steam engine in 1784 (Crutzen 2002).
The International Commission on Stratigraphy (ICS) or the International Union 
of Geological Sciences (IUGS) have not yet approved the term “Anthropocene” as the 
official name of the current geological period (Subramanian 2019), it is nonetheless 
commonly used in the scientific literature. The dispute over the Anthropocene pri-
marily concerns the identification of a point in history when the Earth had actually 
changed. Simon L. Levis and Mark. A. Maslin suggest that 1610 marks the onset of the 
new era. In their opinion, the arrival of Europeans in America irreversibly affected the 
planet (Lewis 2015). In 2019, the Anthropocene Working Group (AWG) was established 
to define the beginning of the era. Among the 34 members of the AWG panel, 29 voted 
in favour of using the term as of the mid-20th century, when the rapidly growing hu-
man population stepped up the rate of industrial production, the use of agricultural 
chemicals and other human activity. Their decision was also affected by the use of 
nuclear weapons, resulting in radioactive debris that became embedded in sediments 
and glacial ice, becoming part of the geologic record. The panel is currently planning 
to submit a formal proposal to determine the start of the new epoch by 2021 to the 
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International Commission on Stratigraphy, which oversees the official geologic time 
chart (Subramanian 2019). 
Another element that proves irreversible human interference in nature is the de-
cline in the diversity of the species that inhabit the planet. Today we are left with a rel-
atively depauperate fauna, and we continue to lose animal species to extinction rap-
idly. Although some debate persists, most of the evidence suggests that humans were 
responsible for the extinction of this Pleistocene fauna (Vignieri 2014). For example, 
in the last two decades, Europe has seen a considerable decline in the population of 
the House Sparrow (Passer domesticus). In the Netherlands, the birds have been put on 
the red list of endangered species. The cause of this can be contributed to the thermal 
insulation of buildings (Marchowski 2015), which prevents the sparrows from nesting, 
as well as the use of chemical plant protection agents or lack of access to grain due to 
changes in corps storage (Leasure 2013). 
(NON)HUMAN ANIMAL ENHANCEMENT
Human control of nature is also apparent in the desire to enhance people and in ge-
netically adapting animals to human needs. According to transhumanists, humans, as 
they are today, are only in a transitional stage towards their future form. Already two 
decades ago, Nic Bostrom and David Pearce initiated the project Humanity+, whose 
roots can be traced to the French post-structuralists (Bakke 2010; Loba 1999; Miś 
1994), but not until now were the goals of the project likely to come into effect. The 
central tenets of transhumanism are contained in the Transhumanist Declaration, 
published in 1998 by the World Transhumanist Association. The Declaration stresses 
the transhumanists’ enthusiasm for state-of-the-art technologies which will influence 
radical changes in humans (Humanity+ 1998). The anticipated changes are to impact 
on nearly all aspects of human life: life span, physical and intellectual ability, as well 
as the creation of artificial intelligence. Recent scientific discoveries make it possible 
to accomplish the transhumanist visions, for instance, the controlling of heredity in 
an increasingly foreseeable way due to IVF mitochondrial transfer or CrisprCAS9 (Żok 
2018). Whilst bioethicists display an extremely opposite approach to the possibility of 
treating humans by way of genome editing, in principle the disputes concern differ-
ences in deontological and consequentialist reasoning. It is, nonetheless, indisputable 
that the reason for reprogenetics research is to improve human health and quality 
of life. On the other hand, from a post-humanist point of view, doubts arise from the 
fact that all medications and technologies that allow people to enjoy a long life and 
good health are, before being used in therapy, tested on animals. Additionally, deeper 
insight into the molecular foundations of life reveals a genetic similarity between hu-
mans and non-human animals, opening the possibility of matching the similarity to 
fit human needs. Animal enhancement takes place on two levels: animals are modified 
to be more useful to people and to use them to test therapies aimed at improving the 
quality of human life. Subsequently, animal enhancement serves a completely differ-
ent purpose than human enhancement; hence the ethical evaluation of this proce-
dure can be entirely different. Developments in biotechnology over the past 25 years 
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have allowed scientists to engineer genetically modified (GM) animals that are used 
in agriculture, medicine and homelife. An example of animal enhancement to better 
serve human needs is the modification of dairy cows or chicken to raise their produc-
tivity. These modified animals should also gain weight faster or be immune to diseas-
es caused by intensive animal farming. Despite such a rationale, the changes cause 
the animals to suffer. For example, the joints of chicken often cannot withstand their 
weight (Forabosco et al. 2013; PETA 2017). 
Another example of animal enhancement is laboratory animals modified to be ani-
mal models for human diseases. Although the use of anatomy and physiology began in 
ancient Greece, the discoveries of the New Genetics have allowed for lasting and more 
useful improvement of animals (Ericsson et al. 2013). 
The most widespread response among both medical researchers and ethicists was 
brought about by the creation of the oncomouse at Harvard University in 19841. Induc-
ing human breast cancer cells into mouse embryos created an animal that is vulner-
able to oncological diseases. The model is currently used in preclinical trials of onco-
logical therapies. Another example are animals with induced diabetes, depression or 
Huntington’s disease. From the point of view of basic and pharmaceutical research, 
these animals provide an ideal research model for specific diseases. 
However, another example of using animals to advance medical research is a specif-
ic group of transplantation procedures, namely xenotransplantation (also called het-
erogenous transplantation). The procedures consist of transplantation between two 
different species. According to the definition of the U.S. Public Health Service: 
Xenotransplantation is now defined to include any procedure that involves the 
transplantation, implantation, or infusion into a human recipient of either (a) 
live cells, tissues, or organs from a non-human animal source or (b) human body 
fluids, cells, tissues or organs that have had ex vivo contact with live nonhuman 
animal cells, tissues, or organs. Furthermore, xenotransplantation products have 
been defined to include live cells, tissues or organs used in xenotransplantation. 
The term xenograft, used in previous PHS documents, will no longer be used to 
refer to all xenotransplantation products2.
Due to a shortage of organs and limited possibilities of conducting allotransplan-
tations3, xenotransplantation is used as an alternative solution, which is, nonetheless, 
controversial in terms of medical, as well as ethical, social, legal and religious consid-
erations. 
The medical success of xenotransplantation is limited due to the risk of hyperacute 
rejection of the transplanted tissue or organ by the recipient’s body, which may be a 
source of medical complications (Rowiński et al. 2014). Primarily, this includes the 
risk of transferring animal pathogenic factors onto humans. Simultaneously, nonmed-
1 European Patent Register entry for European patent no. 0169672, under Inventor(s). Consulted on 
February 22, 2008.
2 U.S. Public Health Service Guideline on Infectious Disease Issues in Xenotransplantation. Retrieved 
August 4, 2019 (https://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/rr5015a1.htm).
3 Allotransplantation (homotransplantation) is transplantation within one species. 
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ical philosophical concerns identify the potential risk of manipulating animal organs, 
which specifically refers to the so-called humanised pigs4 (Bohatyrewicz 1991; Kościel-
niak 2005) or to using monkeys (especially baboons as heart donors and chimpanzees 
as liver donors). The first xenotransplantation procedure was performed in Russia in 
1682, where a piece of a dog’s skull was used to replace a missing skull fragment in a 
wounded man5 (Smorąg et al. 2011). The actual development of experimental trans-
plantation medicine, including transplantation of animal grafts, began in the early 
1920s. It is estimated that between 1906-1995, 70 animal-to-human transplantations 
were performed (Daar 1999). The best known and controversial xenotransplantation 
procedure was conducted in 1984 by Leonard Bailey, who attempted to transplant a 
heart from a baboon to a baby. In literature, this is known as the case of Baby Fae, 
named so to protect the family’s anonymity. The procedure garnered a widespread re-
action when the patient died within 20 days. According to many respondents, the pro-
cedure was unwarranted, no alternative treatments were sought, nothing was known 
about the parents’ informed consent, and doctor Bailey was reluctant to work with the 
media (Borowiec 2019; Tilney 2019). 
In Poland, since 2003 the Institute of Zootechnics in Balice has been conducting 
research on transgenic pigs, supervised by prof. Zygmunt Smorąg. The project, or-
dered by the Ministry of Science and Informatisation, involves 11 research teams rep-
resenting various fields, including molecular biology, embryology, virology, immunol-
ogy, as well as transplantation surgery. The project aims to breed transgenic pigs with 
an edited human gene in order to crossbreed the animals to obtain the best possible 
transplantation organ, and thus, to lower the immunological barrier between humans 
and pigs (Smorąg and Słomski 2005). So far, the outcome of the project is the TG1154 
transgenic hog, whose semen is used to inseminate and reproduce subsequent spec-
imens. Professor Smorąg stresses the importance of various procedures and require-
ments regarding how xenotransplantation products are obtained. A major requisite is 
the source of organs and their effectiveness which leads to appointing a specific series 
number, as well as their safety with regard to their maximum and documented sterility 
(Smorąg 2006). Indisputably, the advantage of xenotransplantation is that it responds 
to the human organ shortage, in addition to the possibility of thoroughly testing, su-
pervising and fully controlling a specific graft (i.e. its size and genetic profile), as well 
as specifically planning transplantation procedures. 
Apart from biotechnical, medical and organisational aspects, xenotransplantation 
involves social and ethical concerns. By their very nature, xenotransplantation gives 
rise to moral dilemmas. Most people approach the use of heterogenous organs with re-
serve. Some fear the existence of an alien, heterogenous organ inside the human body: 
the most perfect, most advanced evolutionary organism. Others are simply afraid of 
rejection or inefficiency of the animal graft. Western European societies clearly differ-
4 Xenotransplantation has, for some time, been perceived as an equivalent alternative to allotransplan-
tation. See: Kościelniak P., Transgeniczne wnuki, „Rzeczpospolita”, 06.12.2005.
5 Smorąg et al. 2011. On the other hand, different sources claim that the first dog-to-human bone trans-
plantation was performed in 1501 in Iran. See: Umana 1995:1481.
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entiate between organs in respect to their species of origin. Considerably less contro-
versial is the use of transgenic animals, for instance bred organs from pigs, than using 
organs from monkeys, despite their anatomic and physiologic similarity to people. 
Primates seem especially close to the human species due to the affinity between them 
(being the closest phylogenetically related). This, however, raises some concerns, as 
the relatively high level of compatibility means that some baboon and chimpanzee 
viral pathogens can infect people (Smorąg and Słomski 2005). Moreover, the breeding 
of monkeys is more demanding. Their fertility is much lower and gestation longer in 
comparison to pigs, which have turned out to be the optimal animals. 
Furthermore, public discourse attaches great importance to religious issues. The 
three monotheistic religions (Judaism, Christianity and Islam) accept xenotransplan-
tation, allowing the use and modification of nature (including the animal world) if 
this serves the development and welfare of humankind. Humans have the right to 
intervene in the work of God. Moreover, Islam and Judaism accept pig xenotransplan-
tation, because they do not see this as the consumption of meat, but as a considerable 
advantage resulting from using animal organs (Smorąg 2011). 
In the Catholic Church, already in 1956 Pope Pius XII spoke of xenotransplantation 
in his address to the Italian Corneal Donors Association and the Italian Blind Associ-
ation, stating that it is acceptable when the transplanted organ does not violate the 
recipient’s mental and genetic identity, and the risk associated with the procedure 
is relatively small (Kniaź 2005). Nonetheless, it should be stressed that the Catholic 
Church has spoken against xenotransplantation in relation to gonads and brain cells 
(Smorąg 2011).
Some other religions, for instance, Buddhism and Hinduism, have different per-
ceptions of the relationship between humans and animals, whilst concerns regarding 
animal organ transplants are left to the believers’ individual judgement. In addition, 
cultural factors play a significant role in the acceptance of xenotransplantation in 
countries where post-mortem allotransplantation is not possible from a social point 
of view. For example, in Japan and India organ transplants from animals are a feasi-
ble alternative, but the opponents of these procedures cite various arguments against 
them, including philosophical, legal and medical factors. Of significance are also the 
above-mentioned arguments concerning the pursuit of anthropocentrism at all costs, 
and the utilitarian nature of such activity when animals become a “reservoir of spare 
parts” for people. Other issues involve potential problems with the recipient’s identity 
and concerns relating to the “tyranny of the gift”6. 
In general, transplantation is usually perceived as a gift (Chyrowicz 2011), as an 
informed and fully voluntary decision. But can we really speak of informed decisions 
in the case of animals? Could the moral dilemma that is harvesting animal organs 
be solved by measures taken to increase the number of allotransplantations? These 
6 The term was used in a somewhat different context by prof. Szawarski in an interview conducted by 
Jakub Kowalski: Kowalski J., Odwaga rezygnacji, „Rzeczypospolita”, Człowiek i nauka, z dn. 26.11.2003. 
In the case of animal organ transplantation, the “tyranny of the gift” may mean a burden that is hard to 
bear by the potential recipient due to the actual source of the organ.
185AGNIESZKA ŻOK & EWA BAUM
measures should target the largest possible groups of recipients to reliably present 
to them the dangers of organ donation, in addition to making them aware that trans-
plantation is a lifesaving procedure which has no other substitute (Baum 2017). Using 
animal organs would not be necessary if there was a significant increase in donations 
from relatives and other unrelated living donors7. 
Legal issues are also a cause of concern as the recipient loses at least some of their 
rights to anonymity and privacy, whilst being obliged to inform the people around 
them (including the medical community) of having a xenograft in their body (Smorąg 
2006). This may cause the organ recipient to feel discomfort and a sense of discrimina-
tion. Another legal aspect is the possible existence of “xenotourism”, in other words, 
organised and commercial journeys to countries where xenotransplantation is possi-
ble8. Nowadays, another example of controversial ethical research is creating animal 
embryos that contain human cells and transplant them into surrogate animals. The 
study was approved in 2019 in Japan (Cyranowski 2019).
Xenotransplantation should, therefore, be perceived not only from the anthropo-
centric perspective, which refers mainly to the risk of rejection of the heterogenous 
transplant but also from the point of view of ecology ethics where the major aspects 
include animal welfare and avoidance of unnecessary pain and stress.  Furthermore, 
the decision to perform xenogeneic transplantation should be preceded by a thorough 
analysis of the potential gains and risks. In addition, alternative methods should be 
considered, as well as the specific patient’s choice (Smorąg and Słomski 2005). 
SUMMARY
Today, scientists who use animals in scientific research must meet a range of criteria 
established in EU directives and local laws (Żok 2019) to provide the animals with 
an appropriate level of wellbeing9 (Mamzer 2016). However, the aim of the research 
is not to improve the health of the animals. First of all, the actual term “animal en-
hancement” is ambiguous, since the wellbeing of the “enhanced” animals is very much 
reduced. In human enhancement, the situation is clear: humans decide for themselves 
which traits are evolutionarily desirable, and which should be discarded. Thus, animal 
enhancement happens from an extremely anthropocentric standpoint whereby peo-
ple decide how to change the animal genome, guided by their own profit. Reservations 
concerning human enhancement result mainly from the historical implications of eu-
genics. It is worth noting that in this context, humans are autonomous agents (Żok, 
Baum 2018), whereas the same cannot be said of animals. The dispute around using 
animals in this way is apparent both in debates about eating animals and their mass 
breeding, as well as using them in laboratories. The ethical evaluation of animal en-
7 In 2018, only 23 liver transplantations from living donors and 295 from deceased donors were carried 
out in Poland. See: Poltransplant, http://www.poltransplant.org.pl/statystyka_2018.html.
8 The issue is analogical to the functioning of the so-called “black market for organs”. 
9 In this respect, the concept of wellbeing is regarded from various perspectives, including the follow-
ing areas: somatic, physiologic, behavioural, emotional, cognitive, psychological and social.  The areas 
overlap and are inherently connected by complex and reciprocal interactions. See: Mamzer 2016. 
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hancement will, therefore, depend upon the adopted ethical standpoint. 
The first approach is that of human domination (Szewczyk 2009), which is extreme-
ly anthropocentric based on the belief that only humans can feel pain and emotions 
and have a consciousness. Nowadays, this assumption does not seem accurate, be-
cause there is no doubt the non-human animals can feel pain and emotions. Further-
more, this approach does not seem to benefit humans. The Anthropocene era10, where 
people have strongly marked their existence on Earth, has led to global warming and 
littering the planet. 
An opposing approach, codified by Tom Regan, emphasises animal rights. Further-
more, Peter Singer advocates treating people and animals with equal respect. Refer-
ring to the philosophy of Jeremy Bentham, Singer situates his theory in direct op-
position to the Cartesian assumption of absolute human domination. Both humans 
and non-human animals have the ability to feel pain; therefore, all beings have equal 
rights to be free from suffering. In The Case for Animal Rights (Szewczyk 2009), Regan 
notes that all sentient beings have basic rights and interests that should not be vio-
lated. Most importantly, making such beings suffer should not be allowed, and subse-
quently, people are obliged to take care of animal welfare. Accordingly, Regan believes 
that anthropocentric research on animal enhancement excludes the animals’ basic 
rights. 
Yet another approach supports the priority of human interests over animal rights. 
Consequently, researchers can use animals but should minimise their suffering and 
reduce their numbers in experiments (Szewczyk 2009). The proponents of experi-
ments on animals believe that most achievements in medical sciences up to the late 
19th century would not have been possible if biomedical research did not use animals 
(Mephan 2008). Subsequently, animal enhancement leads to an important gain for hu-
mans. The organs grown on humanised animals can considerably improve the quality 
of life of people awaiting transplantation. 
As a tenet of the Anthropocene, endeavours to adapt Earth to meet human needs 
include the adapting of non-human animals. The ethical assessment of this phenome-
non will depend on the actual advantage for humans, caring for the modified animals’ 
welfare and the ecological impact of such organisms on the environment. 
Another problem is the fluidity of transition between bodies. Human cells are im-
planted in other animals, allowing to grow organs used in transplantation or to in-
crease the efficacy of tested therapies in humans. With this approach to genetically 
modified animals, an appropriate concept would be that of “biopower” used by Fou-
cault and Donna Haraway. 
The latter compares the hierarchy of organisms to patriarchal or oedipal family 
narratives (Haraway 1997; Braidotti 2006). This understanding of speciesism consti-
tutes an important rationale in contemporary philosophy. In their undefined status, 
the concepts of “cyborg”, “coyote”, “trickster” and “oncomouse” disrupt this discourse. 
10 The concept of the “Anthropocene” is used to describe the contemporary geological age. The Anthro-
pocene narrative presents humanity as a species taking control of the rest of the Earth System. See: 
Malm and Hornborg 2014. 
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Haraway sees the oncomouse as a technical body par excellence: it was created to 
serve profitable trade between the laboratory and the market, between patent offices 
and research centres (Haraway 1997). On the other hand, Haraway emphasises the 
kinship between transgenic animals and humans by calling the oncomouse her sis-
ter (Haraway 1997). Citing the oncomouse as an example, Haraway also notes that 
transgenic animals are becoming contemporary Christs who sacrifice themselves for 
people. The sacrifice of the oncomouse and other transgenic animals will, for instance, 
give many women a chance to recover from diseases that, until now, did not prognoses 
well. 
Moreover, transgenic animals disturb the “culture vs. nature” opposition. Animal 
reproduction is removed from the natural process and takes place with laboratory pre-
cision to increase its usefulness. This enmeshed approach to the oncomouse is char-
acteristic of Haraway’s project, which includes both cognitive and ethical aspects. It 
consists in thinking across established categories, for example, “nature vs culture” or 
“human-made vs human-born”. But it is also a criticism of commodity fetishism and 
the so-called “market economy” in its corporate and global stadium. 
With regard to ethics, the project concerns a new system of affinity to or new forms 
of social connections with “techno-others” (Braidotti 2006a). In the context of rela-
tionships resulting from affinity, the question arises of the relationship between the 
organ recipient and the animal carrier. To use Haraway’s metaphor, the animal, in this 
instance, ceases to be the recipient’s mythical sister actually to become their daughter 
created directly from their genetic material. This leads to a new relationship between 
the donor and the recipient, and those existing until are now, in this case, no longer 
of use (Baum and Wiertlewska-Bielarz 2012). Nonetheless, from an ethical point of 
view, it is difficult to treat the animal as an object. Despite prioritising human interest 
in medical sciences, the animal has to remain important in this relationship. On the 
one hand, it becomes the embodiment of the post-humanist understanding of the hu-
man-animal unity and symbiosis, whilst on the other, it deepens the anthropocentric 
relationship whereby humans are able to control natural processes and increase their 
biopower with respect to nature.
Moreover, Jurgen Habermas observes that the non-human is approached with en-
thusiasm, as well as fear of potentially losing one’s position in the centre of the world 
(Habermas 2003). Experiments consisting of raising the genetic affinity between 
non-human animals and humans blur the differences between them, whilst reinforc-
ing human domination on Earth. At their core, medical, philosophical, ethical and so-
cial concerns refer to the problem of objectified animal sacrifice and their suffering to 
the advantage of humans, which in reality is a dispute between value systems. Within 
this dispute, it is important to remember the anthropomorphism, evolutionary affin-
ity, social relationships and intelligence of animals, so that the so-called “Thrasyma-
chus Law” (Plato 2003), where justice is seen as the “interest of the stronger”, does not 
determine our humaneness.
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